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This study provides a unified growth theory to correctly predict the initially negative and
subsequently positive relationship between child mortality and net reproduction observed
in industrialized countries over the course of their demographic transitions. The model
captures the intricate interplay between technological progress, mortality, fertility, and
economic growth in the transition from Malthusian stagnation to modern growth. It not
only provides an explanation for the demographic observation that fertility rates response
with a delay to lower child mortality, but also identifies a number of turning points over
the course of development, suggesting a high degree of complexity in the relationships
between various economic and demographic variables.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, several unified growth theories have been put forward to try to
motivate the historical shift from economic stagnation to modern growth. Follow-
ing the seminal work by Galor and Weil (2000), the contributions include Jones
(2001), Ko¨gel and Prskawetz (2001), Boucekkine et al. (2002), Galor and Moav
(2002), Lucas (2002), Tamura (2002), Doepke (2004), Cervellati and Sunde (2005,
2007), Galor and Mountford (2008), and Strulik and Weisdorf (2008). Part of this
exercise consists of providing a micro foundation to motivate the fundamental
relationships between economic and demographic variables, from preindustrial
times to the present day. One particular issue that scholars have been struggling
with for a long time (although not only in the context of unified growth theory)
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is the impact of lower child mortality on fertility and net reproduction.1 Most
macroeconomic models are able to replicate the fact that a lower death risk of
children leads to fewer births. However, because falling child mortality reduces
the cost (price) of obtaining surviving offspring, the net rate of reproduction in
these models ends up increasing in response to lower child mortality. That feature,
however, is in contrast to the experience of most industrialized countries in the
later part of their demographic transitions, in which the net rate of reproduction
usually falls [Doepke (2005)].
This study provides a model in which the relationship between child mortality
and net reproduction is negative during the early stages of development, but
then turns positive during the later, more advanced, stages. This notion, which
builds on the fact that fertility, and thus net reproduction, is affected not only
by child mortality itself, but also by the cost of raising children, arises from
combining two existing contributions: Strulik (2008) and Weisdorf (2008). First,
inspired by Strulik (2008), we assume that parents care about surviving offspring
as well as their nutritional status. For a given level of nutritional input, a drop in
the child mortality rate brings parents to reduce their fertility, as more children
now survive. At the same time, a higher survival probability causes parents to
nourish their children better (a quantity–quality substitution effect). That, in turn,
further improves the offspring’s survival probability, which again lowers fertility,
and so on.2 Second, inspired by Weisdorf (2008), we employ the fact that, in a
closed economy, the cost of food goods (and thus of children) relative to other
consumption goods, such as manufactured goods, is affected by the growth of
productivity in agriculture relative to that in industry. The effect from industry
works though the labor market equilibrium condition. That is, when productivity
in the industrial sector grows, industrial workers receive a higher wage rate. In
a closed economy with free labor mobility, this means that agricultural terms of
trade—i.e., the cost of food goods relative to manufactured goods—will have to
adjust to ensure that workers remain in agriculture. Therefore, if parents derive
utility from children as well as from manufactured goods, then a shift in the relative
prices of the two types of commodities (i.e., in the agricultural terms of trade),
caused by a change in the productivity of industry relative to that of agriculture,
will affect the parental decision regarding how many children to give birth to.
The key to understanding why the relationship between mortality and net repro-
duction changes over time, therefore, is that fertility is influenced both by changes
in mortality and by technological advances in industry relative to agriculture.
Hereafter, we use these features to construct a unified growth theory that correctly
predicts the relationship between child mortality and net reproduction over the
course of a demographic transition. The theory accounts for the intricate interplay
between technology, mortality, fertility, and income per capita in the process from
stagnation to growth. The theory is also in line with Engel’s law, replicating
the stylized fact that, as income rises, total food expenditures increase but the
share of food expenditures to income falls. We show that the model is robust to
different specifications regarding the type of preferences assigned to parents; to
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various assumptions concerning the signs of partial derivatives; and to the intro-
duction of a cost of rearing children. When calibrated, the model points to several
nonlinearities in the relationships between variables, such as fertility and popula-
tion growth, as well as population growth and TFP growth. This may explain why
scholars studying the empirical relationships between economic and demographic
variables in the long term have a hard time identifying their correlation.
The paper continues as follows. Section 2 provides a brief introduction to the
stylized facts for Western Europe (particularly England) regarding the evolution
of mortality, fertility, and net reproduction over the long run. It also offers a
summary of the theoretical literature related to the present work. Section 3 details
the theoretical framework, and Section 4 explores its balanced growth dynamics.
Section 5 calibrates the model and analyzes adjustment dynamics. Section 6
discusses extensions of the simple model toward a generalized utility function and
the consideration of time costs of children. Section 7 concludes.
2. THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND THE RELATED LITERATURE
In most Western European countries, the demographic transition occurred in the
later half of the 19th century.3 After peaks in the 19th or early 20th century, the
birth rates in most countries dropped by roughly one-third over the subsequent
50 years. In England, the total fertility rate declined by close to 50%, from nearly
five children per women in 1820 to 2.4 children by 1920. The crude birth rate
followed a similar pattern, declining by 44%, from 36 per thousand inhabitants in
1820 to 20 in 1920 (see Figure 1).
With the exception of France and the United States, a substantial mortality
decline preceded the fall in fertility. In England, the mortality rate began to fall
roughly one and one-half centuries prior to the decline in fertility. During the
early phases of England’s so-called mortality revolution, the fall in mortality was
primarily driven by lower child mortality. Because the fall in the child mortality
rate occurred prior to the fall in fertility, falling mortality initially caused an
increase in the net rate of reproduction. After the onset of the fertility decline,
however, the nature of the relationship between mortality and net reproduction
gradually changed. Falling child mortality was eventually outpaced by the decline
in fertility, after which falling mortality was accompanied by falling rates of net
reproduction.
A unified growth theory that wants to explain the long-run evolution of mortality,
fertility, and net reproduction, therefore, needs not only to account for the increase
of net reproduction and the spike in birth rates observed prior to the fertility
decline, but also to motivate the subsequent decline in rates of fertility and net
reproduction after the fertility transition sets in.
Economic studies on the relationship between child mortality and fertility go
back at least to Becker and Barro (1988, 1989). In the Barro–Becker model, parents
derive utility from surviving offspring. Their fertility decisions are affected by the
cost of producing surviving offspring. Lower child mortality reduces the cost of
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FIGURE 1. Crude birth rates, crude death rates, and net reproduction rates for England,
1721–1931. Sources: Wrigley (1969), Wrigley and Schofield (1984), and Reher (2004).
surviving offspring, so when the child mortality rate falls, it induces parents to
give birth to more children. In combination, the falling rate of child mortality and
the rising rate of fertility lead to a higher rate of net reproduction. But because
the net rate of reproduction was falling in the later stages of the demographic
transition, Barro–Becker models are forced to come up with other explanations
for the fertility decline in addition to falling child mortality in order to motivate
falling net reproduction [Doepke (2005)].
Among recent studies in which mortality plays a role in the process of de-
velopment, a falling net rate of reproduction is motivated by a shift from child
quality to child quantity, generated through parental investments in children’s
education [Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2000); Ehrlich and Kim (2005); Soares (2005);
Azarnert (2006); Kalemli-Ozcan (2008)]. Later refinements invoke a shift from
exogenous to endogenous mortality to capture the long-run trends in economic
and demographic variables [Jones (2001); Kalemli-Ozcan (2002, 2008); Lagerlo¨f
(2003; Weisdorf (2004); Doepke (2005); Hazan and Zoabi (2006)]. Jones (2001),
Lagerlo¨f (2003), and Weisdorf (2004) compare directly to our work in that they
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analyze the effect of child mortality on fertility in the context of unified growth
theory. Remarkably, their models all share the feature that falling death rates
have no impact on parental decisions regarding the number of births. In Jones
(2001), the preferences of parents imply that the elasticity of substitution between
consumption goods and children is always greater than one, an assumption that
ultimately generates a drop in fertility as income grows. In Lagerlo¨f (2003) and
Weisdorf (2004), the decline in fertility is a result of human capital accumulation,
i.e., a parental trade-off effect from child quantity and quality.
Here, we set out to explore the direct influence of child mortality on the parental
fertility decision. We do so by extending the unified growth theory proposed by
Strulik and Weisdorf (2008). Whereas our previous work neglects the role of death
in development, the mortality rate in the current setup is made endogenous—that
is, the child mortality rate is influenced partly by the level of nutrition that parents
decide to provide for their offspring, and partly by general health factors (such as
the availability of medicine and the provision for sewage), all of which are assumed
to be exogenous to parents. When the general health factors improve, captured
in the model by technological progress taking place in the manufacturing sector,
parents find it advantageous to allocate more resources to nourishing their children.
This induced child quantity–quality trade-off provides a link from economic to
demographic factors. This makes our work comparable to a study by Cervellati
and Sunde (2007), who also investigate the linkage between mortality and fertility
over the very long run. They focus on the interaction between education and
adult longevity as a driving force behind economic growth, emphasizing the skill
premium as a key factor in the transition from stagnation to growth. Their work
is particularly comparable to ours in the sense that they, too, highlight the role of
relative prices in development.
3. THE MODEL
3.1. Fertility, Mortality, and Net Reproduction
We consider a two-period overlapping-generations economy with children and
adults. Let Lt denote the number of adults in period t , and nt the number of
births per adult.4 The birth rate (referred to also as the fertility rate) is determined
endogenously later. The variable πt ∈ [0, 1] measures the survival probability of
offspring. By application of the law of large numbers, the variable πt also measures
the fraction of children who are born in period t and are still alive in period t + 1.
The net rate of reproduction, i.e., the number of offspring reaching the fertile age,
is thus πtnt . The changes in the size of the labor force (identical to the size of the
adult population) between any two periods can thus be expressed as
Lt+1 = πtntLt . (1)
We consider two types of child survival probability: an extrinsic and an intrinsic
survival rate. The extrinsic rate, denoted π¯t ∈ [0, 1], is exogenous to parents.
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Potentially, it could be affected by the geographic location of the family (its disease
environment), the medical knowledge available, and the degree of urbanization.
In contrast, the intrinsic survival rate can be influenced by parents through the
amount of nutrition that they decide to invest in their offspring. Let ht denote
food expenditure per child. If we ignore the modern-day problem of obesity,
which seems relevant in the present long-term context, then it seems reasonable
to assume that food expenditures have a positive effect on the survival rate of
offspring, but with diminishing returns.
Whether better nutrition is more effective when extrinsic survival is high or low,
however, is an unsettled issue in the literature. Standard evolutionary arguments
based, for example, on antagonist pleiotropy or disposable soma theory suggest that
somatic investment (nutrition) is less effective in increasing survival when extrinsic
survival rates are low [see, e.g., Williams (1957); Stearns (1992)]. That would
suggest a positive cross derivative, i.e., ∂2πt/(∂h∂π¯t ) > 0. On the other hand,
recent empirical evidence in biology [Williams and Day (2003)] indicates that
somatic investment does indeed become more effective as extrinsic survival rates
decrease, which would suggest a negative cross derivative, i.e., ∂2πt/(∂h∂π¯t ) < 0.
The latter assumption has been introduced into nutrition-based long-run growth
theory by Strulik (2008), and into evolutionary growth theory by Galor and Moav
(2005). In light of these conflicting views, we leave the sign of the cross derivative
generally undetermined and discuss its impact on comparative dynamics later
on. A functional form, which is simple enough to derive straightforward explicit
solutions, is given by
πt = g(ht , π¯t ) = λht π¯t
ht + π¯t + ν . (2)
The symbols λ and ν are parameters measuring the influence of nutrition on
survival probability and the curvature of the survival function. We assume that
λ > 0 and that ν > −π¯t for all t . The important derivatives are
gh ≡ ∂πt
∂ht
= λπ¯t (ν + π¯t )
(ht + π¯t + ν)2 > 0, ghh ≡
∂2πt
∂π¯2t
= − 2λπ¯t (ν + π¯t )




= λ [2π¯tht + ν(ht + π¯t + ν)]
(ht + π¯t + ν)3 .
It follows that nutritional input has a positive effect on the survival probability of
children, but with diminishing returns. Because π¯t enters g(ht , π¯t ) in a symmetric
way, we also conclude that there are positive and diminishing returns of improving
extrinsic survival. The sign of the cross derivative, however, is undetermined.
In particular, we have ghπ¯ < 0 for −π¯ < ν < −2π¯β/γ and ghπ¯ > 0 for
ν > −2π¯β/γ . In the calibration section, this will allow us to investigate the
impact of different cross derivatives on the adjustment dynamics predicted by the
model for the demographic transition and the process of industrialization.
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3.2. Preferences and Optimization
Adult individuals maximize utility, which is derived from three sources: surviving
offspring, πtnt , the nutritional status of offspring, ht , and the number of manufac-
tured goods consumed, mt . We assume that preferences are described by a utility
function, in which the elasticity of marginal utility is higher for ht and nt than
for mt . This serves to capture the fact that parents, in times of crisis, will try to
smooth out their fertility, as well as the nutritional status of their offspring, more
than their consumption of other less vital (i.e., manufactured) goods [Livi-Bacci
(2006)]. The simplest utility function that captures such a “hierarchy of needs” is
of quasi-linear form as given by
ut = mt + β log(ht ) + γ log(πtnt ), γ > β > 0. (3)
A quasi-linear function allows us to obtain an explicit and analytically simple
solution to the optimization problem of parents. In Section 6, we will generalize
the utility function with the purpose of investigating numerically the robustness
of the model in this regard. Furthermore, as in Becker (1960) and Andreoni (1989),
the parameter β measures the extent to which parents care about the nutritional
status of their offspring. We will make the assumption that γ > β, which implies
that parents without any children do not allocate income to child nutrition. To
make the model tractable, we assume that nutritional goods are demanded only
during childhood, and some of them are then stored for adulthood.5 The price
of manufactured goods is set to one, so that pt denotes the price of one unit of
nutrition (food), measured in terms of manufactured goods. We will let children
who suffer child mortality perish at the end of the childhood period. This means
that every child born consumes ht units of nutrition, and that the total costs of
raising nt children, measured in terms of manufactured goods, is pthtnt . The
budget constraint of an individual adult thus is
wt = pthtnt + mt, (4)
where wt is parental income (also measured in terms of manufactured goods). In
Section 6, we expand the model to include a cost of child rearing as well and then
investigate numerically how such a construction affects the results.
Inserting (2) and (4) into (3) leads to the following optimization problem:
max
nt ,ht
ut = wt − ptntht − β log ht + γ log nt + γ log g(πt , ht ).
The first-order conditions for a maximum are
∂ut
∂nt
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In Appendix A, we show, using the second-order conditions, that the solution of
(5) and (6) is in fact a maximum. Multiplying (6) by ht and subtracting it from (5)









It thus follows that, regardless of the specification of the survival function, the
optimal amount of food expenditure per child, ht , is independent of the relative
price of food, pt . This result builds on the fact that prices multiplied by quantities
make up total food expenditure, pthtnt , and that the quantities nt and ht enter
expenditures symmetrically. The price of food, however, has a negative effect
on the number of children demanded. This can be seen from inserting (7) into
(5), which gives us that nt = γ /(ptht ). That captures the well-known child
quantity–quality trade-off: a high child quality (or, in the Beckerian sense, a
higher expenditure ptht per child) implies a lower child quantity.
By inserting (2) into (5) and (6) and solving for fertility and food expenditure,
nt = γ (γ − β)
ptβ(π¯t + ν) , (8)
ht = β(π¯t + ν)
γ − β . (9)
Note that the optimal expenditure per child, ht , is a positive function of the
extrinsic child survival rate π¯t regardless of the sign of the cross derivative.
The key feature generating this result is that the survival elasticity of food expen-
diture is a positive function of the extrinsic survival rate, and a negative function
of the food expenditure. This, in turn, follows from the facts that (i) the survival
rate πt is a positive function of the extrinsic survival rate π¯ and (ii) there are
diminishing returns of food expenditure. To see this more clearly, note from (7)
that parents prefer a constant survival elasticity of food expenditure, h ≡ gh ·h/g;
that is, h = (γ −β)/γ . By inserting (2), we obtain that h = (π¯ +ν)/(π¯ +h+ν)
with ∂h/∂π > 0 and ∂h/∂h < 0. Thus, the optimal response to an improving
extrinsic survival rate is to increase food expenditure. It should be noted that the
parental preference for a constant survival elasticity is not driven by a particular
specification of the survival function. Rather, it stems from the fact that child qual-
ity and quantity enter the utility function in a symmetric way (with the weights of
β and γ ).
From the demand function for offspring (8) we conclude that children are normal
goods: the demand for children falls when the price of children rises. Because of
the specific preference function, there is no direct income effect on the demand
for children. We will introduce a direct income effect later on (in Section 7) by
including time costs of child rearing. Note that an improvement in the extrinsic
survival rate triggers a higher food expenditure, which improves the nutritional
status of offspring. This follows from the child quality–quantity trade-off effect,
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which implies that an improvement in the extrinsic survival rate (π¯t ) reduces the
fertility rate (nt ) and increases the survival rate (πt ). It implies that there is a
positive correlation between child mortality and fertility, a conclusion consistent
with the empirical evidence [Galloway et al. (1998); Eckstein et al. (1999); Herzer
et al. (2011)].
The impact of the extrinsic survival rate on the net rate of fertility, i.e., on
population growth, however, is a priori undetermined. By combining (8) and (9)
with (2), we have that the net fertility rate is given by
πtnt = (γ − β)π¯λ
pt (π¯ + ν) ,
∂(πtnt )
∂π¯t
= (γ − β)λν
pt (π¯t + ν)2 . (10)
It follows that the net rate of fertility is an increasing function of the influence of
nutrition in reducing mortality, captured by the parameter λ.
The curvature parameter ν governs how the extrinsic survival rate affects the net
fertility rate. Generally, higher π¯ leads to higher net fertility directly and indirectly
through the induced higher food expenditure and improved intrinsic survival (the
survival effect), and it leads to lower net fertility through the induced reduction
of births (the fertility effect). For the special case in which ν = 0, the survival
effect and the fertility effect balance each other and the model predicts that the net
fertility rate is independent of the extrinsic survival rate. This is a standard result
in Malthusian models with exogenous child mortality [see Galor (2011, Ch. 4)].
For ν > 0 the model predicts—in line with recent evidence [Herzer et al.
(2011)]—that a lower child mortality rate leads to a lower birth rate and a higher
net fertility rate. The survival effect dominates the fertility effect. Although this
prediction is shared with many other economic models of endogenous fertility [see
Doepke (2005)], it appears to contradict the common view of demographers [see,
e.g., Cleland (2001)]. Demographers normally emphasize that the demographic
transition is triggered by falling mortality. During the transition, the net rate
of fertility eventually falls below its initial level (with a delay). The view of
demographers suggests that the fertility effect dominates the survival effect. In the
present model, we can capture this view by setting ν < 0.
3.3. Production
We consider a dual-sector economy with agriculture and industry. In both sectors,
new technology arises from learning by doing. More specifically, output, as well




)α = At+1 − At, 0 < α, ε < 1, (11)
YMt = δMφt LMt = Mt+1 − Mt, 0 < φ < 1. (12)
The variable At measures total factor productivity (TFP) in agriculture, whereas
Mt measures TFP in industry (manufacturing). The evolution of A and M arises
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from learning-by-doing, following Arrow (1962), Romer (1986), and—in a setup
with endogenous fertility—Kremer (1993).
The learning-by-doing approach seems appropriate for investigating techno-
logical and economic development throughout most of human history, simply
because the bulk of technological improvements in history were not generated
by scientists, at least not until after the mid 19th century [Mokyr (2002)]. Since
then, however, knowledge production has increasingly become a market activity,
rendering the Arrow–Romer approach less appropriate. For this reason, we expect
that the model will lose some of it predictive power from the 20th century on.
Following Arrow (1962), we assume that there are diminishing returns to new
knowledge in both sectors by demanding that 0 < ε, φ < 1. Agricultural pro-
duction is subject to constant returns to labor and land. Land is assumed to be
in fixed supply, and the total amount is normalized to one. With 0 < α < 1,
there are thus diminishing returns to labor in agriculture. Industrial production,
in contrast, is subject to constant returns to labor, implying that land is not an
important factor in industrial production. As is standard in the related literature,
we abstract throughout from the use of physical capital in production.
3.4. Equilibrium
The variables LAt and LMt measure the total amounts of labor input into agriculture
and industry, respectively. Together, they make up the entire labor force; i.e.,
LAt + LMt = Lt . (13)
The share of workers devoted to agriculture, LAt /Lt , is determined by the
market equilibrium condition for nutritional (i.e., food or agricultural) goods. The
equilibrium condition says that the total supply of nutrition, YAt , must be equal
to the total demand, which—given that each child demands ht units of food—is
htntLt . Using (11), the market equilibrium condition for nutrition thus implies














Note that agricultural TFP growth is able to release labor from agriculture, whereas
population growth and a higher level of nutrition per child have the opposite effect.
Suppose that there are no property rights over land, meaning that the land rent
is zero, and thus that a representative adult individual receives the average product
of the sector in which it is employed, wAt = pYAt /LAt , wMt = YMt /LMt . The labor
market equilibrium condition then implies that the real price of nutrition adjusts, so
that agricultural and industrial workers are able to earn the same income, implying
wages wAt = wMt = wt = ptYAt /LAt = YMt /LMt . By the use of (8) and (9) and of
(10)–(14), this means that the price of one unit of nutrition, measured in terms of
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It follows that the price of nutrition increases with TFP growth in industry, as
well as with the size of the population, whereas TFP growth in agriculture has the
opposite effect.











· (γ − β)π¯tλ
π¯t + ν . (16)
The two main forces affecting the net rate of reproduction are clearly visible in
(16). The first term captures the negative effect from a higher price of nutrition.
The second term contains the effect of a lower extrinsic child mortality rate, which
may be positive or negative depending on the sign of ν.
Finally, it seems instructive to have a look at the determinants of the extrin-
sic mortality rate. Because nutritional expenditures influence only the intrinsic
mortality rate, the determinants of π¯t will include geography (i.e., the disease en-
vironment) as well as technical knowledge. As regards the influence of technical
knowledge on mortality, we are inspired by Cutler et al. (2006, p. 116), who in
their survey on the determinants of mortality conclude that “[k]nowledge, science
and technology are the keys to any coherent explanation. Mortality in England
began to decline in the wake of the Enlightenment, directly through application to
health of new ideas about personal health and public administration, and indirectly
through increased productivity.” We capture this fact by assuming that advances in
industrial knowledge, measured by Mt , are a good indicator of health-improving
ideas including, for example, sewerage, water toilets, central heating, clinical
devices, vaccines, pharmaceuticals, and medical knowledge in general. The role
of geography works best if we treat it as a constant.
The process of industrialization may have affected child survival probabilities
also through increasing rates of urbanization. For England and Wales, for example,
Wrigley et al. (1997) document that falling child mortality occurred primarily in
rural areas around the time of the industrial revolution. In contrast, in cities such
as London, child mortality initially increased as a result of the crowded living
conditions that urban life entailed, so that urban areas experienced a mortality
revolution later than was the case in the English countryside. We capture this
effect by taking the share of manufacturing, i.e., the share of workers not occupied
with agriculture, measured by 1 − θt , as a proxy for the rate of urbanization, and
include a negative impact of 1− θ on the extrinsic child survival rate. Specifically,
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we assume that π¯t evolves according to
π¯t = a ·
[
1 − e−bMt+d(θ0−θt )] . (17)
Here, the parameter a reflects the impact of geography (and other relevant con-
stants) on the survival rate; b captures the power of knowledge in reducing the
number of deaths; and d captures the negative impact of urbanization (1 − θt ) rel-
ative to the initial degree of urbanization (at time 0), i.e., (1 − θt )− (1 − θ0). Note
that, by construction, the share 1 − θt is limited from above, whereas knowledge
grows forever. Hence, we expect to have only a temporary effect of increasing rates
of urbanization on mortality, and that this effect eventually becomes dominated
by the positive impact on mortality of an increasing level of technical knowledge.
In the limit, therefore, it follows that limMt→∞ π¯t = a < 1.
4. BALANCED AND UNBALANCED GROWTH IN THE LONG RUN
In the following, we explore the balanced growth dynamics of the model. Along a
balanced growth path, all the variables are constant or grow at constant rates. Let a
balanced growth rate of a variable x be denoted by gx (to be identified by a missing
time index). According to (11), the gross rate of growth of TFP in agriculture is
given by gAt = (At+1 −At)/At = μ(LAt )α/A1−t . Along a balanced growth path,
the left-hand side is constant by definition, so the right-hand side must be constant
as well. Furthermore, the share of labor in agriculture must be constant, implying
that LA grows at the same rate as L. Thus, a constant rate of growth of TFP in
agriculture requires that
1 + gA = (1 + gL)α/(1−). (18)
Similarly, we get from (12) that a constant rate of growth of TFP in industry
requires that
1 + gM = (1 + gL)1/(1−φ). (19)
Taking first differences of (16), the rate of population growth can be written as
1 + gLt+1 =
π¯t+1(π¯t + ν)
π¯t (π¯t+1 + ν) ·
(1 + gAt )(1 + gLt )α
(1 + gMt )αφ
. (20)
Along a balanced growth path, the level of TFP in industry either is constant or
is growing at a constant rate. In either case, π¯ will eventually assume a constant
value, meaning that, along a balanced growth path, the first term on the right-hand
side will be equal to one. Using this information, and inserting (18) and (19) into
(20), we find that the equilibrium law of motion for the growth of population is
given by




, η ≡ α + α
1 −  −
φα
1 − φ . (21)
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Along a balanced growth path, the population grows at a constant rate, meaning
that gLt+1 = gLt = gL. This leaves two possibilities for balanced growth. Either
there is no population growth (gL = 0) or—assuming the knife-edge condition
that η = 1—the population is growing or shrinking at a constant rate. However,
it follows from (18) that |η| < 1 is required for stability reasons. Therefore,
the growth-on-the-knife-edge case not only demands a very specific parameter
constellation; it also requires that the economy starts off on a balanced growth
path (with suitable initial values) and remains on this path forever (which is impos-
sible in the event of shocks). This essentially eliminates the possibility of having
balanced growth in combination with population growth. The implication—that
there is no population growth on a balanced growth path—means that there is also
no TFP growth in the steady state (as can be verified by looking at (18) and (19)).
This conclusion is summarized in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 1. There exists a unique balanced growth path with zero popu-
lation growth and zero (exponential) economic growth. A sufficiently small knowl-
edge elasticity in agriculture, i.e.,
 <
1 − φ − α + 2αφ
1 − φ + αφ , (22)
prevents the case of unbalanced growth in the long run.
The proof is found in the Appendix.6
5. LONG-RUN ADJUSTMENT DYNAMICS
5.1. Intuition
The aim of this section is to test if the model is capable of replicating the stylized
development pattern of an industrialized economy, from the preindustrial era up
to the present day and beyond.7 Before turning to explore the model’s adjustment
dynamics toward the balanced growth path, we will briefly go over the intuition
behind the development path leading to the steady state.
Suppose we start off with an economy in which the population level is relatively
small; the share of labor employed in agriculture is relatively high; and the level
of income per capita is relatively close to subsistence. Furthermore, suppose
that birth rates and child mortality are both relatively high, meaning that the net
rate of reproduction is close to replacement. Roughly speaking, these are the
characteristics of a preindustrial, agricultural society.
As explained in the model section, there are economies of scale in population
size. Because the initial population level is low, learning-by-doing effects, to begin
with, are relatively modest. Hence, TFP growth in agriculture is rather slow, yet
faster than in industry, where labor resources, and thus learning-by-doing effects,
are even smaller.
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Growing TFP in agriculture has two effects on development. On one hand,
because it releases labor from agriculture, it increases the share of labor allocated
to industrial activities. On the other hand, higher TFP growth in agriculture rela-
tive to industry makes nutrition, and therefore children, relatively less expensive.
According to (8), this raises fertility, which tends to increase the net rate of
reproduction.
At the same time, with economies of scale at work, both in agriculture and in
industry, the transfer of labor out of agriculture gradually speeds up TFP growth in
industry. As the expansion of industrial knowledge gains momentum, the extrinsic
child survival probability begins to increase. This leads parents to allocate more
resources to nutrition per child, which further improves the survival probability of
the offspring through a reduction in intrinsic child mortality.
It is clear that falling mortality increases the net rate of reproduction through the
survival effect. Yet, at the same time, falling mortality reduces fertility, which, in
isolation, diminishes the net rate of reproduction, as follows from (16). However,
as long as advances in industrial knowledge and thus in child mortality reduction
are relatively slow, the “cheaper nutrition” effect on the net rate of reproduction
dominates the “mortality decline” effect. Hence, during early stages of develop-
ment, the net rate of reproduction rate will go up. In this period, therefore, declining
child mortality is accompanied by rising rates of birth and net reproduction.
Because the transfer of labor out of agriculture gradually accelerates TFP growth
in industry, the industrial sector’s TFP growth rate eventually surpasses that of
agriculture. Henceforth, the price of nutrition gradually increases, and children
become increasingly more expensive. All else equal, this leads to a lower rate
of birth, and, therefore, a fall in the net rate of reproduction. At the same time,
advances in industrial knowledge create a further decline of extrinsic mortality,
leading to more investment in the children’s nutritional status and, therefore, to
lower intrinsic mortality. Hence, in contrast to the previous periods, declining
child mortality is now accompanied by falling rates of birth and net reproduction.
Eventually, the child survival rate reaches its maximum. Because of rising prices
of nutrition, however, the birth rate continues to fall. Sooner or later, therefore, the
net rate of reproduction reaches replacement, and population growth ultimately
(and endogenously) comes to a halt.
5.2. Calibration
To investigate adjustment dynamics, we continue by calibrating the model. The pa-
rameter values are chosen so that the peak of the demographic transition matches
that of 19th-century England and so that the maximum rate of industrial TFP
growth (and subsequent slowdown) appears in the late 20th century. For compar-
ative purposes, we use as many parameter values as possible from the benchmark
case in Strulik and Weisdorf (2008). The following parameters produce a peak of
population growth, at a annual rate of 1.5%, in the year 1875, as well as a peak
of industrial TFP growth, at a rate of 2 percent, in the late 20th century: α = 0.8,
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 = φ = 0.3, μ = 0.22, δ = 2.5, and γ = 3.4. The parameters a, b, λ, and β
are chosen so that the child survival probability is about two-thirds in the High
Middle Ages [Wrigley et al. (1997)], and then reaches a maximum of just below
100% in the 20th century.
In the benchmark case we set ν = 0. This textbook case of neutralizing effects
of mortality change and fertility response on net fertility [Galor (2011, Chp. 4)] is
helpful here because any changes in the net rate of reproduction are now explained
by the relative price of nutrition. For illustrative purposes, we begin with the case
where there are no negative feedback effects of urbanization on extrinsic mortality
(d = 0). The remaining parameter values are thus set to a = 0.5, b = 0.2, β = 0.5,
and λ = 35. For better readability of the results, one generation is set to 25 years,
approximately the length of the fecundity period. We set θ0 = LA0 /L0 = 0.85 and
start values A0 and L0, so that the peak in the growth rate of population is reached
in 1875 for an economy starting in the year 1 C.E. The value for M0 is obtained
endogenously and is given by (γ /δθ0)1/φ .
5.3. The Benchmark Case
Figure 2 illustrates the calibrated adjustment path. The period shown runs from
the year 1200 to the year 2200. The solid lines show the path for the benchmark
economy with d = 0. Initially, the labor force is predominately employed to
agriculture. In line with the numbers provided by Galor (2005), industrial TFP
growth is almost absent during the early stages of development. Productivity
growth in agriculture is around 0.4% per year during the High Middle Ages,
supporting a population growth rate of 0.5% per year.
Increasing knowledge in agriculture initially manifests itself in a slowly decreas-
ing price of nutrition, which translates almost entirely into population growth,
meaning that standards of living are hardly affected by technological progress.
The slowly but steadily growing population gradually increases knowledge in
agriculture, and agricultural TFP growth builds up, little by little, to eventually
reach a 1.4% growth rate in the early 20th century. By then, agricultural TFP
growth makes possible a substantial transfer of labor into manufacturing, causing
an upsurge in industrial TFP growth. This substantiates a significant decline in the
extrinsic child mortality rate, leading parents to increase their spending on child
nutrition. With decreasing rates of extrinsic and intrinsic mortality, child survival
probability is on a fast rise.
In the late 19th century, TFP growth in manufacturing surpasses TFP growth
in agriculture and the relative price of food begins to increase, inducing people to
spend more resources on industrial goods while reducing their fertility. By the end
of the 20th century, the demographic transition is almost complete: child survival
probability has reached its maximum value, close to 100% and the net rate of
reproduction is close to replacement level. TFP growth in industry reaches its
peak in the late 20th century and then begins to slow down. This decline, however,
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FIGURE 2. Long-run dynamics: benchmark case. Benchmark case, neutralizing effects of
mortality on net fertility (ν = 0). Solid lines: no feedback from urbanization to mortality
(d = 0). Dashed lines: negative feedback from urbanization (d = 5).
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is a gradual process, leaving enough momentum for the rate of growth of industrial
TFP to exceed 1% per year far into the 22nd century.8
The first calibration exercise, with d = 0, fails to take into account the “urban
penalty,” i.e. the negative feedback from urbanization on the survival probability
of offspring. This drawback of the model implies that mortality and fertility both
start to decline “too soon”. The red (dashed) lines in Figure 2 show a simulation
that corrects for this shortcoming, obtained by setting d = 5. In this case, the onset
of the fertility decline is delayed until the early 19th century. One can think of the
gap between the solid line and the dashed line for child survival as capturing the
gap between rural and urban child mortality.
5.4. The Response of Net Fertility to Extrinsic Mortality and
the Shape of Transitional Dynamics
We now discuss the impact of the sign of the cross derivative gπ¯h, as well
as the association between the extrinsic child mortality rate and the net rate
of reproduction, on the transitional adjustment path. The blue (solid) lines in
Figure 3 reiterate the benchmark case with the curvature parameter ν set to 0. The
green (dash–dotted) lines show trajectories for ν = 0.15. In this case, we have
that ∂(πn)/∂π¯ > 0 (and the cross derivative gπ¯h is larger than in the benchmark
case). As a consequence, parents in the model reduce their fertility and increase
their food expenditure. To see why, one needs to recall that parents prefer to keep
the survival elasticity of health expenditure h constant at the level (γ − β)/γ .
The partial effect of an increase of the curvature parameter ν is an increase of the
survival elasticity, ∂h/∂ν = h/(π¯ +h+ν). The optimal response by parents is to
increase the level of food expenditures up to the point at which decreasing returns
of nutritional input bring the elasticity back to its desired value.
The main effect of the reduction in net fertility, and hence the lower growth
of population, is that the demographic transition is now delayed. Because the
population level is now smaller at every stage of development than it was in
the benchmark run, the scale effect of learning by doing is smaller, causing a
postponement in the transfer of labor out of agriculture and in the demographic
transition. In Figure 3, we eliminate this effect by readjusting the initial values for
the size of knowledge and population, so that every set of trajectories displays a
peak of net fertility in 1875. In this way the shape of the trajectories is comparable
across illustrations. Relative to the onset of the decline net fertility, the survival
rate begins to improve earlier for η > 0 because of the induced shift from child
quantity to quality.
Red (dashed) lines in Figure 3 show a scenario for which η is equal to −0.15,
implying a negative association between the extrinsic survival rate and the net
fertility rate, as well as a negative cross derivative gπ¯h (because 2βπ + γ ν < 0).
Keeping in mind the intuition developed previously, parents now react to improving
mortality by spending less on nutrition and by demanding more children instead.
As a consequence, the population growth rate follows a “higher” path relative to
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FIGURE 3. The extrinsic survival–net fertility association and long-run dynamics. Blue
(solid lines): benchmark case, neutralizing effects of mortality on net fertility (ν = 0).
Dash–dotted lines: positive association between survival and net fertility (ν = 0.15).
Dashed lines: negative association between survival and net fertility (ν = −0.15). Other
parameters as for Figure 2.
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FIGURE 4. The extrinsic survival–net fertility association: scale-adjusted dynamics. Solid
lines: benchmark case, neutralizing effects of mortality on net fertility (ν = 0). Dash-dotted
lines: positive association between survival and net fertility (ν = 0.15, μ = 0.27). Dashed
lines: negative association between survival and net fertility (ν = −0.15, μ = 0.155).
Other parameters as for Figure 2.
the benchmark case, and it peaks at a higher rate. The survival probability starts to
improve at a later point in time, which is caused by the fact that parents are now
spending fewer resources on food.
It is instructive to eliminate the scale in these adjustment dynamics. For that,
we adjust the level of agricultural productivity μ so that every set of trajectories
displays a peak of population growth at a rate of 1.5% in the year 1875. Some
of the results of this adjustment are illustrated in Figure 4. Controlling for the
scale reveals that the association between extrinsic child mortality and fertility
(governed by the parameter ν) is indeed helpful in explaining the observable gap
between the onset of improving child survival and the onset of fertility decline. The
larger ν is, the larger is the predicted gap between mortality and fertility decline.
The overall impression, however, is that the results are largely independent of
assumptions about the cross derivative and the partial response of net fertility to
changes in the extrinsic child mortality rate. In fact, only details of the predicted
shapes of adjustment paths are modified.
5.5. Timing and Correlations along the Adjustment Path
The introduction of an endogenous child mortality rate leads us to qualify the
conclusions reached in Strulik and Weisdorf (2008) regarding the timing of the
demographic transition. In that study, the peak of the population growth rate
coincides with that of fertility, both of which, in turn, take place after the growth
of industrial TFP has surpassed that of agriculture. Here, by contrast, the breakup
of the population growth rate into a fertility and a mortality component permits us
to track the occurrence of significant economic and demographic events separately.
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For example, in the benchmark case, the fertility rate peaks around 1800, whereas
the population growth rate reaches its maximum in 1875. The rate of agricultural
TFP growth peaks around 1920, whereas the rate of industrial TFP growth reaches
its maximum in the late 20th century. Moreover, consistent with empirical evidence
from most Western countries (France is an exception), the falling child mortality
rate in the present framework precedes the drop in fertility. Hence, the current
model correctly predicts the positive relationship between child mortality and
net reproduction observed during the early phases of most Western countries’
demographic transitions, a feature missing in previous work on this topic.
The model also predicts that the demographic transition and the economic take-
off are accompanied by a structural change, i.e., θ → 0 for t → ∞. The speed
of this structural change during industrialization, however, is underestimated for
the set of basic parameters. Because everything is fully endogenous in the present
model (i.e., none of the time series are imputed, as in some of the related literature),
it is impossible to correct this shortcoming without resorting to less acceptable
approximations. By highlighting the interplay between demographic and eco-
nomic variables, the model is capable of replicating the stylized facts of long-term
economic development without resorting to other sources of structural change,
such as capital accumulation, international trade (globalization), and R&D-based
growth.
Our model also generates some interesting nonlinearities along the adjustment
path. Based on Figure 5, which shows some of the relevant nonmonotonic rela-
tionships (for the benchmark economy), the following observations can be made.
First, during early stages of development, the model predicts a positive relationship
between the child survival probability rate and that of fertility, whereas, during
later stages, the sign of the correlation is reversed (panel 1). Specifically, the
lower mortality rate goes together with a rising rate of fertility when the effect of
falling food prices on fertility dominates the quantity–quality substitution effect.
In contrast, the lower mortality rate goes together with a lower fertility rate when
the quantity–quality substitution effect dominates that of falling food prices.
Second, because of a strong preventive-check mechanism during the early
phases of development, there is almost no correlation between wages and popu-
lation growth at the beginning of the period analyzed. In later stages, however,
such as during the time of the demographic transition, there is a strong negative
relationship between the two, followed by a weak negative correlation after the
ending of the transition (panel 2).
Third, the general relationship between the birth rate (total fertility) and the
net rate of reproduction is a slightly positive one (panel 3). That is, during the
early stages of development, the birth rate and net rate of reproduction are both
rising, whereas both rates are falling during the late stages. For a short period in
between, however, the birth rate is declining while the net rate of reproduction is
still growing.
Finally, the relationship between the net rate of reproduction and industrial TFP
growth forms an almost perfect orbit (panel 4). In the early stages of development,
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FIGURE 5. Correlations along the transition: 1200 to 2200. A circle marks the starting point
in the year 1200.
there is a positive relationship between TFP growth and population growth. How-
ever, during the “industrial revolution,” i.e., the sharp rise in the rate of growth
of industrial TFP, the sign of the correlation turns negative. In the postindustrial
period, i.e., after the peak in the growth rate of industrial TFP, the sign turns
positive once again, as the rates of growth of productivity and population both
decrease.
5.6. Engel’s Law
A final observation concerns the model’s consistency with Engel’s Law.
Engel’s Law states that the share of nutrition expenditure in income, measured
by (ptntht )/wt , will decline over the course of development (i.e., with eco-
nomic growth). This is illustrated in Figure 6, which also shows that nutritional
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FIGURE 6. Engel’s law and expenditure per child.
expenditure per child, measured by ptht , gradually drops until the mid-19th
century and then increases steeply throughout the 20th century; after which it
continues to increase, but at a somewhat slower pace than earlier (for comparison,
the results are shown relative to initial expenditure; i.e., the level of expenditure
in 1200 is normalized to one). These results reveal another important insight from
endogenizing child mortality: because more children survive at high levels of M ,
parents are more inclined to increase their spending on child nutrition, irrespective
of a rising relative price for food.
6. EXTENSIONS
In this section we generalize the utility function and include time costs of child-






1 − σ + β log ht + γ log(πtnt ) (23)
s.t. wt (1 − τnt ) = pthtnt + mt. (24)
Child survival continues to be given by (2). With 0 < σ < 1, the utility function
is now strictly concave, but it also preserves the “hierarchy of needs” assumption
introduced in Section 3. Manufactured goods are more easily substituted across
time than are births and nutrition. The parameter τ controls for the time intensity
of child bearing and rearing.




1 − σ + β log ht + γ nt + γg(π¯t , ht ) + ω [wt(1 − τnt ) − pthtnt − mt ] ,
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and the first-order conditions are





+ ωptnt , (26)
0 = γ
nt
− ωptht − ωτwt . (27)




· h = γ − β − m−σt τwtnt . (28)
Note that (28) collapses into (7) when τ = 0. Thus, as long as τ = 0, optimal
food expenditure per child is the same regardless of the specification of the utility
function. Inspection of (25)–(27) further reveals two opposing effects on fertility:
one from higher wages, and thus higher opportunity costs of child rearing, which
lowers fertility; and one coming from a higher expenditure on manufactured goods
through decreasing marginal utility of goods consumption, which raises fertility.
To obtain the general-equilibrium effect, we solve (24)–(27) together with the
equilibrium condition for the goods market,
pαt (htnt )
α−1μAt = (δMφt )αL1−αt ,
and the wage equation wt = δMφt , to obtain the equilibrium set {ht ,mt , nt , pt }
at any point in time, that is, for any given set of state variables {At,Mt , Lt }. The
model is no longer able to generate an explicit analytical solution, so we solve the
problem numerically.
Figure 7 shows an extract of the adjustment paths for the benchmark case
(σ = 0, solid lines), as well as for σ = 0.2 (dashed lines) and σ = 0.4 (dash–
dotted lines). One effect of isoelastic utility from manufactured goods is that
marginal utility is high when the consumption level is low (before the onset
of industrialization). Ceteris paribus, this means that households demand more
manufactured goods and fewer children (with food expenditure per child remaining
fixed, for reasons explained previously). In turn, the fall in fertility causes slower
growth of population, smaller scale effects through learning by doing, and thus
a later onset of the demographic transition. To eliminate this scale effect and to
compare the shape of the adjustment paths, we have readjusted the initial values
for population and knowledge in 1200, so that both sets of trajectories display a
peak of population growth in 1875.
Figure 7 illustrates that isoelastic utility causes a larger gap between the mor-
tality decline and the net fertility decline, as well as an earlier and faster process
of industrialization. In the case of England, therefore, the assumption of isoelastic
utility is more realistic in that the predicted trajectories fit better with historical
evidence. These effects increase with the size of σ , as the dashed–dotted lines
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FIGURE 7. Isoelastic utility: long-run dynamics. Solid lines: benchmark run. Dashed lines:
σ = 0.2. Dash-dotted lines: σ = 0.4.
illustrates when σ = 0.4 . At the same time, however, a higher σ causes the model
to underperform: the predicted decline of population growth in the 20th century
is too small compared to the actual time series. The reason is that diminishing
marginal utility generates a low demand for manufactured goods when the level of
consumption becomes relatively large. In comparison to the case of linear utility,
households thus demand relatively few manufactured goods and relatively many
children and react less strongly to falling prices of manufactured goods.
As a final extension, we include a cost of rearing children. Figure 8 considers
an example where τ = 0.05. Ceteris paribus, the presence of the child-rearing
costs reduces the demand for children, and thus delays the demographic transition
compared to the benchmark case. Again, initial values are adjusted so that any set
of trajectories displays a peak in net fertility in 1875 (to better compare the shape
of adjustment paths). An additional effect of introducing the child time costs is
that it increases child expenditures and consequently child survival rates. To match
the child mortality statistics of the middle ages—that about one-third of children
born do not make it to adulthood—we recalibrate the extrinsic survival prospects
by setting a = 0.29. Furthermore, we also set agricultural productivity μ to 0.26
in order to reach a peak rate of population growth at 1.5%.
Solid lines in Figure 8 shows the benchmark case, whereas dashed lines illustrate
the recalibrated case in which time costs of child rearing are added to the model.
The main consequence of including the cost of child rearing is a growing gap
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FIGURE 8. Time cost of child rearing: long-run dynamics. Solid lines: benchmark run.
Dashed lines: τ = 0.05 (and a = 0.29, μ = 0.26). Dash-dotted lines: τ = 0.05 and
σ = 0.2 (and a = 0.29, μ = 0.25). Other parameters as for Figure 2.
use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1365100512000302
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Open University Library, on 29 Jan 2017 at 23:28:46, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
CHILD COSTS AND SURVIVAL AND THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 139
between the mortality and fertility transitions, coming about through an earlier
mortality decline. Another visible implication is a very large undershooting of
fertility, falling far below the replacement rate in the 21st century. This is caused
by the rise in income, which increases the opportunity costs of raising children,
causing parents to reduce fertility.
The ideal setting, of course, is to combine the two adjustment paths derived
earlier—that based on the assumption about isoelastic utility (which rendered
fertilty “too high”) and that from the introduction of a cost to raising children
(which rendered fertility “too low”). The dash–dotted lines of Figure 8 take up
this idea to the graph, showing the adjustment paths for τ = 0.05 and σ = 0.2
(and recalibrating μ in order to match the peak of net fertility in 1875).
The combined case shows that the model and its predictions are robust to the
inclusion of a time cost of child rearing as well as the introduction of an assumption
about isoelastic utility for manufactured goods. Although the times series for
fertility, population growth, and agricultural productivity virtually coincide, the
extended model predicts an earlier onset of the mortality decline; a stronger and
steeper fall of agricultural employment during the 19th century; and a higher
growth rate of productivity, and thus income per worker, in the 20th century.
Taken together, the two extension thus add more realism to the model vis-a`-vis
the historical evidence.
7. CONCLUSION
This study provides the first unified growth model to endogenize mortality, fer-
tility, and growth, while not relying on human capital accumulation to generate
a demographic transition. The result is based on the notion that parents care not
only about surviving offspring but also about the nutritional status of the offspring,
and that the price of nutritional goods, which thus influences the fertility decision,
responds to structural transformations in the productive sectors of the economy.
The model provides an economic rationale for the demographic observation that
fertility rates decline in response to higher child survival probability and that they
do so with a delay. Another major implication of the study, demonstrated by the use
of calibrations, is the nonmonotonic nature of the relationships between various
economic and demographic variables—an important insight for scholars trying
to make sense of these relationships empirically. The study also shows that the
basic structure of long-run adjustment dynamics is independent of (i) the specific
assumptions concerning cross derivatives; (ii) the direction of impact of extrinsic
mortality on net fertility; (iii) more general specifications of the utility function;
and (iv) consideration of the time costs of child rearing. Alternative specifications
will lead to modifications concerning the shape of adjustment paths, which allows
fine tuning of the peaks and gaps observed during the process of industrialization
and the demographic transition.
The robustness tests done in Strulik and Weisdorf (2008) make us confident
that the current model is also robust to other modifications. First, the assumption
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of a constant–returns to labor production technology in industry can be replaced
by one that relies on diminishing returns to labor without affecting the model’s
qualitative conclusions. Second, the long-run predictions of the model, i.e., the
lack of economic growth in the steady state, can be modified without changes in
the qualitative nature of the results as long as we permit a positive rate of growth
of the population on the balanced growth path. Both modifications, however, come
at a cost to simplicity.
NOTES
1. Net reproduction measures the number of offspring (normally women) living through to the end
of their fertile age.
2. This is consistent with empirical evidence that suggests that nutrition played a key role in
Britain’s mortality transition [Harris (2004)] and that malnutrition has severe effects on child mortality
[see Rice et al. (2000); Pelletier et al. (2003); and Caulfield et al. (2004)].
3. For a more detailed description of Western Europe’s economic and demographic patterns, see
Galor (2005).
4. To keep the model tractable, we assume that nt is continuous, and that reproduction is asexual.
5. It will not affect the qualitative nature of the results if, instead, the individual’s nutritional
demand were to be divided over two periods.
6. Note that the term “unbalanced growth” refers to an equilibrium growth path along which growth
rates are exploding or imploding (and should not be confused with “unstable”, i.e., off-equilibrium
growth).
7. For a detailed description of the development course of industrialized countries, see Galor
(2005).
8. Because GDP per worker grows at the rate of wages, which grow at the rate φgM , growth of
GDP per worker can be inferred as a scaled version of growth of TFP in manufacturing. For the scaling
factor φ = 0.3, the model predicts too little growth of GDP per worker. This shortcoming can only be
corrected at the expense of less accurate predictions elsewhere. It is a natural implication of the fact
that our simple model neglects other important drivers of growth such as, the accumulation of physical
and human capital.
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APPENDIX
A.1. SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR MAXIMUM
For the solution (8) and (9) to be a maximum, the Hessian evaluated at the extremum has
to be negative definite. For that, the Hessian determinant has to be positive. Proceeding
from (5) and (6) and keeping the survival function for now in its general form g(π¯t , ht ) the
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Recall that the solution (5) and (6) fulfils ntht = γ /pt , implying that ∂2ut/∂(ntht ) =
−γ /(ntht ). The Hessian determinant is thus obtained as








































In words, the survival function has to be sufficiently concave. Inserting (2), the condition
becomes
2(π¯ + ν)ht + (π¯ + ν)2








> 1 − β
γ
⇒ 1 > β
γ
.
It is fulfilled for γ > β, that is, always when a positive (interior) solution for nt and ht
exists. The extremum (8) and (9) is a maximum.
A.2. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Although a balanced growth path involves stagnant levels of population and income, an
unbalanced growth path, characterized by imploding or exploding growth, may in principle
exist. In the following, we explore the two cases of unbalanced growth, starting with the case
of imploding growth. Imploding growth implies perpetually negative population growth,
i.e., nt is smaller than one and Lt is decreasing. It is easy to see that imploding growth is
not an option because gAt and gMt are bound to be non-negative. There is no forgetting by
doing. With limL→0 gA = 0 and limL→0 gM = 0, we have limL→0 n = const./L1−α from
(14). As Lt converges to zero, nt goes to infinity, a contradiction to the initial assumption of
nt being smaller than one. There is no imploding growth. Intuitively, decreasing marginal
returns of labor in agriculture (α < 1) prevent implosion. As population size decreases,
agricultural productivity goes up and prices go down, so that fertility and thus the next
period’s population increase.
Explosive growth, on the other hand, cannot be ruled out if η > 1, In this case the relative
price of food ultimately goes to zero and fertility to infinity. With growing population
growth, productivity growth in both sectors grows hyperexponentially until the economy
reaches infinite fertility in finite time. We can solve the stability condition η < 1 for
the critical . A sufficient condition for stability of balanced growth is (22). Thus, the
learning elasticity in agriculture must not be too large. Otherwise, agricultural productivity
rises so steeply with population growth that it can sustain further falling food and triggers
further population growth. Inspection of (18) shows that the critical  is decreasing in α
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and increasing in φ. Intuitively, the larger the counterbalancing forces of limited land (i.e.,
the lower α) and of learning in the manufacturing sector (the larger φ) are, the higher can
learning in the agricultural sector be without leading to explosion. The following proposition
summarizes the considerations made previously about balanced and unbalanced growth.
Note that  < crit is a sufficient condition of stability because it holds for any path along
which there is constant population growth. It could be relaxed for the only existing balanced
growth path, according to which, as shown, population growth is not only constant but also
zero. For an intuition of the result, inspect (20) again and imagine adjustment dynamics
along which an “agricultural revolution” occurs before an “industrial revolution,” i.e. a path
along which gA is—because of decreasing returns—already declining, whereas gM is still
on the rise. The fact that gA and thus gL are approaching zero faster than gM relaxes the
stability condition obtained from analytical considerations, which implicitly assume that
all growth rates are in the neighborhood of a balanced growth path.
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